Contrary to frequent recommendations of the public finance literature and international institutions, a persistently high tax wedge on labor is observed in Europe. Simultaneously, the scope for shifting taxes to more growth-friendly revenue sources appears underused. This motivates our simulation of a tax shift from labor to property for Germany, a country where property tax revenues are particularly low and the tax wedge on labor income is among the highest in industrialized countries. We simulate a reform where property is no longer taxed by its (often) outdated cadastral value but by its market value, using the additional revenue to reduce social insurance contributions (SIC). To make such a simulation possible, we match property-related information with the input data of the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD. We find a considerable increase in property tax revenues, allowing to reduce the implicit tax rate on labor from 37.2% to 36.5%. Distributive effects tend to be modest, and depend critically on the design of the SIC reduction. Overall, our results suggest that more households would gain than lose from the tax shift, with gainers mostly situated in the middle of the income distribution.
Introduction
A high implicit tax rate on labor is often said to be detrimental to growth and employment (e.g. Arnold et al. 2011 , Myles 2009 ). In general, the literature suggests that taxes levied on consumption or property are less distortionary and growth-harming than those levied on corporate or labor income (Mankiw et al. 2009 , Slemrod 1990 . Despite these ndings, the scope for shifting taxes to more growth-friendly revenue sources appears underused in many countries. For instance, various institutions have frequently advised European governments to augment growth potentials by shifting the tax burden away from labor to other tax bases such as property (e.g. European Council 2015 , OECD 2014 , IMF 2013 . Germany in particular has been identied as a country which makes only little use of property taxes, 1 while having a high implicit tax rate on labor (see Figure 1 ).
At the same time, the distribution of income and wealth has become more uneven in many advanced economies (including Germany) over the past few decades, and nding better ways to tax auent households is back on the policy agenda of many governments (Atkinson & Piketty 2010 , Peichl et al. 2010 , Bach et al. 2009 ). Property constitutes the quantitatively most important wealth asset of German households, and the development of real estate prices has been found a crucial component of observed wealth inequalities (Lindner 2015) .
The use of outdated cadastral values to determine property tax liabilities is commonly said to be an important reason why revenues from taxing property are so low in Germany (Spahn 2004) . Indeed, the current valuation of real estate dening the property tax base dates back to 1964 in Western Germany and to 1935 in Eastern Germany. Various scholars have argued for a revaluation of such cadastral values, but no reform has been carried out (e.g. Blöchliger 2015 , Färber et al. 2014 . Similar situations with very outdated cadastral values determining property tax liability can be found in several other European countries (Andrews et al. 2011 ).
Our study rst simulates a property tax reform for Germany in which the tax base is no more dened by the cadastral value but by the market value of the property. To assess distributional consequences, we study changes in pre-and post-reform property tax liabilities as well as in disposable income across the income distribution of households.
Hence, we follow existing literature recommending the analysis of the joint distribution of income and wealth when interested in distributive eects (e.g. Peichl & Pestel 2013 ).
Further, we simulate two revenue-neutral scenarios in which the additional tax receipts are used to nance a reduction of social insurance contributions on labor income, focusing on rst-order eects. Finally, we discuss the dierent distributional implications of the proposed reform scenarios.
Simulating such a policy reform is dicult since there exists no data source which provides information on both current property tax liability and the actual market value of the property.
2 However, the HFCS (Household Finance and Consumption Survey) 1 Please note that "property taxes" in this paper describe recurrent levies on immovable real estate owned by private households, i.e. excluding transaction taxes as well as property taxes on corporate assets.
2 Only in its survey of 1988, the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) asked respondents about the 2 of the ECB provides extensive information regarding the value of properties owned. In addition, the EU-SILC survey (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions) contains information on property taxes currently paid. In order to conduct our simulation, we match the two representative survey micro datasets. Performing a number of validity checks we show that especially on a more aggregate level such as household income deciles, the matched dataset preserves the properties of the original HFCS dataset suciently well.
The matched dataset is then used to simulate a property tax reform that applies current market values instead of cadastral values. In a rst scenario, we assess the potential revenue gain induced by the use of up-to-date property values. Next, we simulate a revenue-neutral scenario in which the additional revenue is used to lower social insurance contributions (SIC) via a lump sum SIC credit. As a third scenario, we simulate a proportional reduction of social insurance contributions, again under revenue-neutrality.
All simulations are carried out using EUROMOD the tax-benet microsimulation model for EU member states. It allows to evaluate changes in households' disposable income induced by the dierent scenarios.
From a budgetary perspective, our simulations suggest that the revenue from property taxation would raise from currently e 5.8 bil. to e 16.3 bil. This additional revenue would allow a reduction of the implicit tax rate on labor from currently 37.2 % to 36.5 %. Examining distributive eects, our results rst indicate that the (average) percentage increase in the property tax liability is roughly constant across the income distribution of property owners. Hence, the relative size of the property tax liability across the income distribution of homeowners is by and large preserved, which suggests that the reassessment of cadastral values does not hurt a certain income group of property owners in particular. Second, when examining the eect of the proposed update of cadastral values (again without redistributing the additional revenue) across the entire income distribution, we nd that the relative change in disposable income varies little across income deciles. Thus, an update of cadastral values without using the additional revenue to lower the tax burden on labor would render such a reform virtually neutral in terms of redistribution.
Finally, we turn towards the two revenue-neutral scenarios in which the additional tax receipts are used to lower the tax burden on labor income, considering rst-order eects only. We nd that when a lump sum SIC credit is granted, all household deciles would gain in disposable income except of the top three ones. In contrast, when using the additional revenue for a proportional reduction of social insurance contributions, the eect on disposable income is small and relatively similar across the income distribution.
In sum, we nd for both scenarios that more households would gain than lose from the tax shift, with gainers mostly situated in the middle of the income distribution.
Our results relate to existing literature in a number of ways. First, several proposals cadastral and market values of their main household residence. However, three shortcomings make the use of this joint observation impractical. First, the information dates back to 1988, and property values have changed substantially since then. Second, SOEP only collected ordinal measures of market value. Third and most importantly, information on property is only available for the main household residence and not for any other real estate owned.
3 have been made to increase tax revenues from wealth and property (e.g. Bach et al. 2014 , Piketty 2014 . Our paper adds to this literature by assessing the revenue potential of an important policy tool, namely an up-to-date valuation of the property tax base.
Furthermore, previous authors have pointed out that the redistributive element of the German property tax in its current form is rather limited (Bach & Schratzenstaller 2013) .
Our results support this view and indicate that this would not be substantially dierent once cadastral values are updated. In fact, our ndings suggest that the potential for redistribution (if desired by the legislator) depends on the simultaneous reduction of the tax burden on labor.
In addition, our results speak to the literature analysing the distributive eects of tax shifts from labor income towards other tax bases such as consumption (e.g. Pestel & Sommer 2016) . So far, little empirical work has been dedicated to property tax related simulations, mostly driven by data limitations. A notable exception is Moscarola et al. (2015) , assessing labor market reactions of a property and labor tax reform in Italy. In a similar vein, Figari et al. (2016) investigate the scal and distributional consequences of including homeowners' imputed rent in personal taxable income as a kind of property tax for six European countries. Using up-to-date property values to determine property taxes could be regarded as an important complement (and maybe even as a substitute depending on the specic design) to housing income taxation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as followed: Section 2 illustrates the institutional background of property taxes in Germany. Section 3 describes the matching procedure which combines the two datasets. An analysis of the quality and validity of the matched dataset is provided in Section 4. The simulated tax reform and its distributional and revenue eects are described in Section 5. The nal section contains a conclusive discussion of our results.
Motivation and institutional background
As stressed above, Germany appears to have considerable scope to reform the valuation of property used for property taxation. Basic cross-country comparable descriptives underpin this view. Figure 1 illustrates large disparities across EU-28's member states with regard to revenue of property taxes and the implicit tax rate on labor. Revenues from property taxes are comparatively low for Germany (0.44% of GDP vs. 1.5% in EU-28). At the same time, the ITR on labor in Germany is above average ( 37.2% vs.
36.1% in EU-28).
So far, several attempts to reform German property taxation have been made, e.g. an overhaul of the Grundsteuer was part of the national Reform Program 2014 and 2015 but put on hold hitherto. As a consequence, the current valuation of property dates back to 1964 in Western Germany and to 1935 in Eastern Germany. Back then, rateable values 3 were assessed on the basis of capitalized gross returns (i.e. rental income) or, in the case of owner occupied dwellings, on the basis of construction costs (for details 3 Please note that we use the term "cadastral value" and "rateable value" interchangeably. 4 To partly oset the nominally xed cadastral values, municipalities apply local tax multipliers in addition to the federal rate. However, the multipliers are set on municipality level only, and hence do not account for heterogenous developments of property values within a given municipality. In addition, the increase in multipliers over time does not match ination adjustment (see Section 5.1 for details).
5 Already in 1992 German scal authorities executed a comparison of selling prices with underlying cadastral values and found a ratio of ca. 5 to 1 (Bach et al. 2012) .
From a policy perspective, two reasons render a reform of the current property tax system in Germany important and hence, our simulation relevant. First, a sunset clause in the German Finanzausgleich -an equalization payment in the German multi-level government -makes its reorganization inevitable by the end of 2018. Since it is often argued that reforms of property tax regimes should be linked to reforms of intergovernmental scal frameworks (e.g. Devereux et al. 2007 6 In line with Lindner (2015) and Zhan (2015) , we nd real estate as the quantitatively most important wealth component of German households. Summary statistics on the two main variables of interest are presented in Table 1 . Finally, both surveys contain a number of overlapping variables which we will use below for the matching procedure.
Methodology of statistical matching
Statistical matching aims to create a dataset from dierent sources which do not contain the same units. The dierence to record linkage, which uses e.g. social security numbers to link identical units, is that statistical matching combines similar ones (Rässler 2002) .
Statistical matching in our context allows for imputing the property value Y from HFCS (donor) to SILC (recipient) via a number of appropriate matching variables. These matching variables should be strongly correlated with the merger variable Y and be jointly observed with (Y ) as well as (X), i.e. appear in both datasets.
Although EU-SILC does not contain property values, it does provide information on whether a household owns property and how much property tax it pays. Through the 6 Due to non-response, the most auent households are likely to be underrepresented in the HFCS.
This issue can be addressed by assuming that the upper tail of the wealth distribution approximates a Pareto distribution (Vermeulen 2016 
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We apply a so-called hot deck matching procedure which assigns each observation in HFCS to at least one nearest neighbor unit in SILC that is most similar with respect to the matching variables. Nearest is dened as the associated observational unit that shows the smallest distance metric based on the set of matching variables. Specically, we transform the data into uncorrelated, standardized variables with variance equal to 1 and then compute the Euclidean distance between two vectors x and y (McLachlan 2004) . Let C denote covariance matrix and the superscript T the matrix transpose, the distance between a HFCS observation x = (x 1 , x 2, x 3, ..., x N )
T and a SILC observation y = (y 1 , y 2, y 3, ..., y N )
T is then dened as:
Since our recipient dataset (EU-SILC) is more than three times larger than our donor dataset, donor units may be used for dierent recipient units repeatedly. Such a marriage algorithm is known as polygamy (Rässler 2002) . If the marriage is restricted to a single spouse (monogamy) we would lose almost three quarters of our SILC observations. Hence, we opted for a n > 1 nearest neighbor match with multiple use of donor units (from HFCS). The nal matched dataset we generate consists of 13,079 household observations, among which the 6,629 households liable for property taxes are enriched by the market value of their properties. In the next section we will assess the quality of the matched dataset by comparing its properties, marginal, and joint distributions to the original HFCS dataset.
7 Before applying statistical matching it is important to make sure that the data collection and survey design of HFCS and SILC are comparable. In Section A.1, we discuss coherence requirements such as reference period, target population and collection process of the two datasets. 
In order to not only compare means but get a deeper understanding whether the joint distribution is preserved in the matched dataset, the same procedure is conducted using quantile regression. We estimate quantile regressions with coecients for the 75th quantile.
8 The rst column of Table 2 shows that for the mean regression, the H 0 cannot be rejected across all matching variables. Looking at the results based on quantile regressions (the second column), we continue to nd no signicant dierences in the distribution for most of the matching variables. In sum, our results suggest that both the marginal and joint distributions in the original HFCS are suciently preserved in the matched dataset. As a nal step, we make use of auxiliary information to assess the quality and validity of the matched dataset. Specically, we use the variable property (market) value at time of acquisition (which we only observe in HFCS) as an instrument for the current property tax liability (which we only observe in SILC). The idea is that for survey respondents 8 Using quantile regressions on the .50 and .95 quantile, we receive similar results.
9 who acquired their property around the year of the last general assessment in 1964, the variable property value at time of acquisition should be highly correlated with the cadastral value of this property, and thus with the current property tax liability. Hence, we can assess the quality of our matched dataset by comparing the (post-match) rank position of the property value at the time of acquisition with the rank position of the current property tax liability of these respondents.
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To make this quality assessment valid, we restrict our analysis to households who acquired their property around the year of the last assessment, since the (market) value at the time of acquisition should come very close to the cadastral value of the property (we set a interval of +/− 5 years around 1964).
10 Further, we only use households whose only property is their main residence, since property value at time of acquisition is only inquired for the dwelling the household lives in. Notes: This gure is based on a subsample of households which acquired the property around the year of the last assessment of cadastral values (1964) . It presents a binned scatterplot of the relationship between a household's rank position of the property value at time of acquisition and a household's rank position of the current property tax liability using our matched dataset. To construct the gure, we split observations into 20 equal-sized bins based on the rank position of the current property tax liability and plot the mean rank position of the property value at time of acquisition within each bin (the y-axis). See text for details. 10 Please note that in 1964 the legislator dened cadastral values as the price that could be realized [...] in the case of a sale (see Spahn 2004.) rank-rank relationship is almost perfectly linear, suggesting that our matching procedure assigns the underlying property value to the current tax liability reasonably well. The relationship between the two ranks is measured via a Spearman's rho and yields ρ = 0.74.
Given that we have no information about improvements made to the property since 1964 (which would change the cadastral value of the respective property and hence its property tax liability), we consider this a suciently high degree of similarity. In sum, we conclude that our matched dataset should allow for valid inferences, especially on a more aggregated level such as income deciles. In the next section we will run our simulations on this matched dataset.
Microsimulation of a property tax reform
Our policy reform simulations are performed on EUROMOD (version G2.0), the taxbenet microsimulation model designed for EU member states. It applies national taxbenet policy rules to harmonized micro-data and calculates their eects on household disposable income (Sutherland & Figari 2013) 
Current property taxation and simulated reform
In this section we provide details regarding property taxation in Germany and our proposed policy reform. In our analysis we focus on property taxes levied on (nonagricultural) land, buildings and improvements. All legal regulations of the German property tax, i.e., the denition of the tax base, federal tax rates as well as legal norms regarding the property assessment are set at the federal level. Specically, the German property tax is calculated as the product of three components: the cadastral value of the property, the federal tax rate and a municipality tax multiplier. Equation (2) formally 11 Please note that our simulation abstracts from potential changes in labor supply, avoidance or tax incidence. In general, relatively modest labor supply responses have been found for Germany (e.g. Bargain & Peichl 2017 ). Furthermore, Löer & Siegloch (2015) using German data nd that in the short run, the incidence of the property tax is borne by landlords. Other scholars argue that this might also be the case in the long-run (Broer 2013) . In this context, it is also important to note that two-thirds of the total property tax collected stem from owner-occupied housing, which cannot be shifted onto a third-party. In addition, it has been proposed that a reformed property tax should use legal requirements to prevent shifting of the tax onto tenants (Fuest 2016) . Finally, we abstract from administrative costs associated with the proposed policy reform. Bach et al. (2014) estimate the total costs of tax assessment with regard to a one-time capital levy on net wealth for Germany to be modest with around 5%.
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shows the calculation of the property tax liability:
property tax = tax multiplier local * tax rate f ederal * rateable value
The tax multiplier is set by the local municipality and has been raised by most German municipalities over time (Löer & Siegloch 2015) . This reects the attempt to at least partly oset the nominally xed cadastral values. However, using municipality tax multipliers to oset nominally xed cadastral values does not provide a comprehensive remedy against outdated rateable values. For instance, any adjustment of the tax multiplier occurs on municipality level only, and hence does not account for heterogenous developments of property values within a given municipality. for East Germany, respectively).
Simulated property tax reform. We simulate a property tax reform in which the taxable base -the rateable value -is no more dened by the cadastral value of the property but by its current market value. Since the introduction and rise of the municipality multiplier after 1964 mostly reects the fact that cadastral values were not adjusted to ination, we do not apply them when calculating the new property tax liability. This is consistent with the idea to simulate a situation in which current market values (instead of cadastral values) determine property taxes due, which makes the use of ination-osetting multipliers redundant. Using current multipliers and current market values would lead to extremely inated estimates of the new property tax liability. In contrast, not using multipliers when calculating the new property tax liability means that our simulation presents a more conservative estimate of the potential revenue eects of such a reform.
Please note that we apply federal tax rates for West Germany to our entire sample, since the reason for the higher federal rate in East Germany is the dierent reference year regarding the last assessment (1935 instead of 1964), which becomes obsolete when using current market values for all German properties.
Three reform scenarios. We simulate three dierent scenarios in conjunction with the proposed property tax reform. While the rst simulation updates the cadastral values without changing any other taxes, the other two scenarios seek to shift part of the tax burden from labor to property:
(1) The update of cadastral values is non-revenue neutral: In this rst scenario we estimate the additional tax revenue collected from the update of cadastral values irrespective of budget neutrality.
(2) Revenue neutrality through a lump sum SIC credit: The extra revenue from the update of cadastral values is oset by a non-refundable lump sum SIC credit granted to all employees (all employees with positive SIC).
12 In addition, the increase in weighted average multipliers since 1974 only accounts for 58% of ination adjustment (Source: own calculations based on data from the Federal Statistical Oce).
(3) Revenue neutrality through a proportional reduction of employees' SIC: Under this scenario, the additional revenue is used to grant a rebate that is proportional to the SIC payment of an employee.
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The rst scenario functions as a gauge for the distributive eects from the sole update of cadastral values. The second reform scenario provides a simulation that especially benets employees at the lower end of the income distribution, where the current tax wedge is particularly large. In the third scenario the size of the SIC rebate is more closely tied to the current SIC payment of the employee.
6. Simulation results
Revenue eects
We start with the overall revenue eect of the proposed property tax reform. The current annual property tax liability for German households owning property equals e 345 on average. The proposed property tax reform changing from cadastral values to market values would raise this average property tax liability to e 967. This would increase the total revenue collected from property taxes substantially from currently e 5.8 bil. to e 16.3 bil.
14 In our second scenario (2), we use this additional revenue to grant a credit on SIC in the amount of maximum e 233 per employee, guaranteeing revenue neutrality.
For the average household, this would reduce annual social insurance contributions from e 6,245 to e 5,920. In our third scenario (3), we apply the additional revenue to grant a 5.2 % rebate on the SIC payment of every employee, again under revenue neutrality.
Distributive eects
Now we want to analyze in greater detail how the reform of the property tax and the dierent scenarios would aect groups of taxpayers dierently. Specically, we examine how the burden of the update of cadastral values is distributed across income deciles of i) property-owners only and ii) the overall population. 15 i) We start with examining changes in household budgets following the increase in property tax liability for proprietors only. Figure 4 shows pre-and post-reform property tax liabilities across income deciles of property owners. It is evident from the gure that the increase in the property tax liability is relatively constant across the income distribution of proprietors with an only slightly more pronounced increase for the top ve deciles. The post-reform property tax liability for each household income decile is 13 In the case of joint lers, the simulated tax reduction (i.e. the lump sum SIC credit and SIC rate reduction, respectively) is granted at household level.
14 Please note that our analysis ceteris paribus focuses on property taxes paid by private households excluding corporations.
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In the following analysis we use equivalized disposable income calculated as market income plus public transfers minus taxes and social insurance contributions. In accordance with established practice, we do account for dierences in household size by applying the modied OECD equivalence scale. For ii) Next we want to study the eect of the proposed update of cadastral values across the entire income distribution (regardless of being homeowner or not). We start with scenario (1), which is the non-revenue neutral simulation. The bars in Figure 5 show the change in disposable income in absolute monetary values (EUR) by disposable income decile. The negative change in income increases with household income, which is expected given that ownership rates in Germany rise substantially with income (see Appendix A.5).
When displaying the relative income change, a dierent picture emerges. The triangles in Figure 5, (2) and (3), where the additional tax revenue is used to lower the tax burden on labor.
Scenario (2) is a simulation in which the additional tax revenue of the proposed update of cadastral values is oset by a non-refundable lump sum SIC credit. Such a lump sum SIC credit corresponds with a relative high tax relief for low income earners, whose contribution rate is reduced to a relatively greater extent. Figure 6 displays the income change on deciles of household disposable income under reform scenario (2). The gure shows that all household deciles would gain in disposable income except of the top three ones.
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The total yearly gains range between e 20 and e 60 on average across the household income deciles, whereas the three top deciles loose between e 15 and e 209 on average. The triangles in Figure 6 display the income change relative to disposable household income, ranging between +0.43 % and -0.40 % for the single deciles.
As a next step we turn to our third reform scenario (3), in which the additional revenue is used to grant a rebate that is proportional to the SIC payment of an employee.
Specically, we simulate a 5.2 % rebate on the social insurance contribution paid by the employee. The impetus for scenario (3) is that employees should enjoy a proportional 17 The reason why the rst decile gains relatively little has to do with the fact that households in this decile are disproportionately more likely to be unemployed, out-of-labor force, or self-employed, which corresponds with zero SIC payments. The same holds for the rst decile of scenario (3). across income deciles do not exceed e 50. In sum, it seems that middle-income households would prot to some extent from this reform scenario, whereas low-and high-income households slightly suer.
Figure 8 provides additional insights into the distributional eects of our simulations.
For each of our two revenue-neutral scenarios we now display the share of gainers and losers per disposable income decile. A household is dened as a gainer (loser) when experiencing a positive (negative) change in disposable income. The upper part of Figure   8 shows the result for reform scenario (2). We nd more gainers than losers, with the share of losers increasing steadily with the income level. In contrast, the share of gainers is much more evenly distributed across income deciles. Turning towards scenario (3), we nd again more gainers than losers, but this time losers are less concentrated in the upper part of the income distribution than under scenario (2). This mirrors our results of losers across all income deciles, except for the top income decile under scenario (2). In contrast, the mean change in disposable income is negative for three income deciles under scenario (2) (see Figure 6 ) and for ve income deciles under scenario (3) (see Figure 7) .
Thus, we conclude that gains of the tax shift are modest but widespread, whereas losses tend to be bigger but less frequent.
Finally, we want to assess overall changes in inequality associated with our three reform scenarios. For this purpose, we employ two widely used inequality indices, namely the Gini and the Atkinson with A ε = 1. In line with our previous results, we nd the nonrevenue neutral scenario (1) to barely change the distribution of income (see Table 3 ). Regarding scenario (2), we observe a small reduction in income inequality. In contrast, scenario (3) would widen the income distribution, though only very slightly. Looking at changes in poverty thresholds (set at 60 % of median disposable income), we barely nd any eect of the three reform scenarios. However, this does not rule out that the proposed tax shift may generate signicant gainers and losers. As the comparison of extensive margin (see Figure 8 ) with the intensive margin (see Figures 6 and 7) already suggests, the worst o 1% might be aected by a considerable income shock in both scenarios (2) and (3). These scenarios could therefore potentially face opposition from asset-rich but income-poor households, which might ask for mitigating measures. This seems to be pertinent especially to the political acceptance of such a reform, given that the issue of property taxation can aect election outcomes (Bosch & Solé-Ollé 2007) . Notes: This gure shows the share of gainers and losers for the reform scenarios (2) and (3). Gainers (losers) are dened as households with a positive (negative) change in disposable income under the respective reform scenario. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. worst o 1 % -13.6 % income -14.4 % income best o 1 % + 4.5 % income + 2.6 % income Notes: "Status Quo" represents the pre-reform situation. "Private property tax revenue" depicts property tax revenues collected from private households, "worst/best o 1 %" depicts the mean percentage loss/gain in disposable income of the 1 % most aected households. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
Conclusion
The idea of higher taxes on land, capital and wealth to nance mounting public debt has gained ground in several OECD countries. At the same time, the scope for shifting taxes to more growth-friendly revenue sources appears underused in many European countries. This seems to be especially true for Germany, a country which makes only little use of property taxes while at the same time having a high implicit tax rate on labor. Against this backdrop we simulate a property tax reform for Germany which increases revenues from the taxation of property while simultaneously lowering the tax burden on labor. Changing the current property tax scheme based on outdated cadastral values to one based on market property values, we nd substantial revenue eects of the proposed reform. Specically, tax collection from private household property would increase from currently e 5.8 bil. to e 16.3 bil., allowing for an overall reduction of the implicit tax rate on labor from 37.2% to 36.5%. Using EU-28 cross-country levels as a comparison, this equates in an improvement of the implicit tax rate on labor by three positions. In contrast, the increase in the ratio of property tax revenue to GDP would change Germany's position by 13 places, with an after-reform level similar to Denmark's (compare Figure 1) . Examining the distributional eects of the reform on household level, we nd the update of cadastral values without using the additional revenue to lower SIC to be virtually neutral in terms of redistribution. As rich and poor households show comparable increases in the (relative) property tax burden, any potential redistribution under the proposed reform depends crucially on the design of the revenue-neutral SIC reduction. While a SIC reduction via a lump-sum tax credit would especially benet low-income households, a SIC rebate proportional to households' current contributions would barely alter the overall distribution of disposable income. This gives policy-makers considerable scope via the specic design of such a reform.
In light of the controversial nature of the outdated taxation of property in Germany and the apparent reluctance of policy-makers to tackle it, our paper reduces uncertainty about both revenue and distributional eects of such a reform. Depending on the exact design, our results suggest that low-and median income households could be made better o when reducing the overall tax burden on labor.
We are aware that shifting taxes from labor to property is not easy to implement, especially in a federal system like Germany where property taxes accrue to local municipalities, and social insurance contributions to federal budgets. In addition, mass appraisal can be both expensive and seem as intrusive. However, our analysis aims to inform about the scal and distributional eects of such a shift, which can then be mapped against institutional costs and legal constraints. While such an analysis is beyond the scope of our paper, it provides a fruitful avenue for future research.
A. Appendix
The following sections provide a detailed description of the dierent steps taken to construct the matched dataset.
A. This small dierence in median annual gross income despite oversampling might reect the very limited oversampling of HFCS in Germany. Oversampling in Germany was only based on geographic information about the distribution of taxable income, whereas other countries applied much more rigorous oversampling based on, e.g., wealth tax records. In sum, we conclude that regarding target population, household denition and reference period, the two survey designs appear to be suciently coherent to allow statistical matching.
A.2. Identication of matching variables
As mentioned in the main text, the careful selection of the matching variables is crucial when using statistical matching (Little & Rubin 2014) . In the spirit of the stepwise approach of Leulescu & Agatei (2013) Table A .3 provides a comprehensive summary of the reconciliation process and a list of the common set of variables from both surveys.
Second, it is important that the common set of variables (i.e. our potential matching variables), which appear both in HFCS and SILC, show similar distributions. We apply Hellinger Distance (HD), a measure to evaluate similarity of variable distribution of two dierent datasets (Webber & Tonkin 2013 , Eurostat 2013 . Equation (3) assesses the similarity/dissimilarity between donor HFCS and recipient SILC for each potential matching variable. A HD value of 0 can be interpreted as perfect similar and a value of 1 as perfect discrepancy. As commonly stated in the literature, an HD of over 5% raises concerns about the similarity in marginal distributions (e.g., Leulescu & Agatei 2013) .
V is the donor dataset (HFCS) and V the recipient dataset (SILC), K is the total number of cells in a contingency As a third step, we want to test the explanatory power of the set of common variables which fulll the condition of coherence and similarity of distributions (i.e. all variables not exceeding the 5% threshold in Figure A .1). According to D'Orazio et al. (2006), common variables for matching should be selected on the basis that they signicantly explain the variation in the merger variable Y , that is the value of properties owned. As standard in the literature, the null hypothesis of no association between common variables and market value of property is tested. We run Rao-Scott tests, a correction of Chi-squared tests for contingency tables when the estimated cell proportions are derived from survey data (Rao & Scott 1981) . In order to also provide a measure of strength of association between two variables, the Pearson correlation coecients are calculated. Table A.2 shows results for the Rao-Scott test and Pearson correlation coecient.
19 As depicted, 13 of the 19 variables that have been found to be similarly distributed across both surveys are also signicantly correlated with our merger variable Y . When regressing the market value of property owned (= Y ) on such 13 variables, we obtain a R 2 of 0.64. Hence, based on overall coherence, similar distributions and sucient predictive power, we select these 13 variables for statistical matching. Notes: Tests of independence -dichotomized for continous variables -cover Pearson's and likelihood-ratio chi-squared, both corrected for the survey design with the second-order correction of Rao and Scott (1984) . Pairwise correlation coecients are calculated allowing for sample design. Signicance levels are based on survey-based variance estimates, with * and ** indicating signifcance at 5-and 1-percent levels, respectively. 
